diff options
author | Rainer Gerhards <rgerhards@adiscon.com> | 2013-09-13 02:39:42 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Rainer Gerhards <rgerhards@adiscon.com> | 2013-09-13 02:39:42 +0200 |
commit | 7903677bfba6fd897010d9c5dbb56531bfe0d825 (patch) | |
tree | 110e409834bab0fb1edd8f869e911c8d8d510493 /runtime/libgcry.c | |
parent | ad777330629c31447018e47b4033a7ebaa9fe655 (diff) | |
parent | 15921d4e4e9d03e0cfd4ca5a9745c89b5dcd37c3 (diff) | |
download | rsyslog-7903677bfba6fd897010d9c5dbb56531bfe0d825.tar.gz rsyslog-7903677bfba6fd897010d9c5dbb56531bfe0d825.tar.bz2 rsyslog-7903677bfba6fd897010d9c5dbb56531bfe0d825.zip |
Merge branch 'v7-stable' into v7-stable-tlsfix
Conflicts:
ChangeLog
runtime/rsyslog.h
Diffstat (limited to 'runtime/libgcry.c')
-rw-r--r-- | runtime/libgcry.c | 426 |
1 files changed, 426 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/runtime/libgcry.c b/runtime/libgcry.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..51c10af4 --- /dev/null +++ b/runtime/libgcry.c @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +/* gcry.c - rsyslog's libgcrypt based crypto provider + * + * Copyright 2013 Adiscon GmbH. + * + * We need to store some additional information in support of encryption. + * For this, we create a side-file, which is named like the actual log + * file, but with the suffix ".encinfo" appended. It contains the following + * records: + * IV:<hex> The initial vector used at block start. Also indicates start + * start of block. + * END:<int> The end offset of the block, as uint64_t in decimal notation. + * This is used during encryption to know when the current + * encryption block ends. + * For the current implementation, there must always be an IV record + * followed by an END record. Each records is LF-terminated. Record + * types can simply be extended in the future by specifying new + * types (like "IV") before the colon. + * To identify a file as rsyslog encryption info file, it must start with + * the line "FILETYPE:rsyslog-enrcyption-info" + * There are some size constraints: the recordtype must be 31 bytes at + * most and the actual value (between : and LF) must be 1023 bytes at most. + * + * This file is part of rsyslog. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * -or- + * see COPYING.ASL20 in the source distribution + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ +#if HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#endif +#include <stdio.h> +#include <gcrypt.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/uio.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#include "rsyslog.h" +#include "libgcry.h" + + +static rsRetVal +eiWriteRec(gcryfile gf, char *recHdr, size_t lenRecHdr, char *buf, size_t lenBuf) +{ + struct iovec iov[3]; + ssize_t nwritten, towrite; + DEFiRet; + + iov[0].iov_base = recHdr; + iov[0].iov_len = lenRecHdr; + iov[1].iov_base = buf; + iov[1].iov_len = lenBuf; + iov[2].iov_base = "\n"; + iov[2].iov_len = 1; + towrite = iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len + iov[2].iov_len; + nwritten = writev(gf->fd, iov, sizeof(iov)/sizeof(struct iovec)); + if(nwritten != towrite) { + DBGPRINTF("eiWrite%s: error writing file, towrite %d, " + "nwritten %d\n", recHdr, (int) towrite, (int) nwritten); + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_EI_WR_ERR); + } + DBGPRINTF("encryption info file %s: written %s, len %d\n", + recHdr, gf->eiName, (int) nwritten); +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + +static rsRetVal +eiOpenRead(gcryfile gf) +{ + DEFiRet; + gf->fd = open((char*)gf->eiName, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); + if(gf->fd == -1) { + ABORT_FINALIZE(errno == ENOENT ? RS_RET_EI_NO_EXISTS : RS_RET_EI_OPN_ERR); + } +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + + +static rsRetVal +eiCheckFiletype(gcryfile gf) +{ + char hdrBuf[128]; + size_t toRead, didRead; + DEFiRet; + + CHKiRet(eiOpenRead(gf)); + if(Debug) memset(hdrBuf, 0, sizeof(hdrBuf)); /* for dbgprintf below! */ + toRead = sizeof("FILETYPE:")-1 + sizeof(RSGCRY_FILETYPE_NAME)-1 + 1; + didRead = read(gf->fd, hdrBuf, toRead); + close(gf->fd); + DBGPRINTF("eiCheckFiletype read %d bytes: '%s'\n", didRead, hdrBuf); + if( didRead != toRead + || strncmp(hdrBuf, "FILETYPE:" RSGCRY_FILETYPE_NAME "\n", toRead)) + iRet = RS_RET_EI_INVLD_FILE; +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + +static rsRetVal +eiOpenAppend(gcryfile gf) +{ + rsRetVal localRet; + DEFiRet; + localRet = eiCheckFiletype(gf); + if(localRet == RS_RET_OK) { + gf->fd = open((char*)gf->eiName, + O_WRONLY|O_APPEND|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC, 0600); + if(gf->fd == -1) { + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_EI_OPN_ERR); + } + } else if(localRet == RS_RET_EI_NO_EXISTS) { + /* looks like we need to create a new file */ + gf->fd = open((char*)gf->eiName, + O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC, 0600); + if(gf->fd == -1) { + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_EI_OPN_ERR); + } + CHKiRet(eiWriteRec(gf, "FILETYPE:", 9, RSGCRY_FILETYPE_NAME, + sizeof(RSGCRY_FILETYPE_NAME)-1)); + } else { + gf->fd = -1; + ABORT_FINALIZE(localRet); + } + DBGPRINTF("encryption info file %s: opened as #%d\n", + gf->eiName, gf->fd); +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + +static rsRetVal +eiWriteIV(gcryfile gf, uchar *iv) +{ + static const char hexchars[16] = + {'0','1','2','3','4','5','6','7','8','9','a','b','c','d','e','f'}; + unsigned iSrc, iDst; + char hex[4096]; + DEFiRet; + + if(gf->blkLength > sizeof(hex)/2) { + DBGPRINTF("eiWriteIV: crypto block len way too large, aborting " + "write"); + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_ERR); + } + + for(iSrc = iDst = 0 ; iSrc < gf->blkLength ; ++iSrc) { + hex[iDst++] = hexchars[iv[iSrc]>>4]; + hex[iDst++] = hexchars[iv[iSrc]&0x0f]; + } + + iRet = eiWriteRec(gf, "IV:", 3, hex, gf->blkLength*2); +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + +/* we do not return an error state, as we MUST close the file, + * no matter what happens. + */ +static void +eiClose(gcryfile gf, off64_t offsLogfile) +{ + char offs[21]; + size_t len; + if(gf->fd == -1) + return; + /* 2^64 is 20 digits, so the snprintf buffer is large enough */ + len = snprintf(offs, sizeof(offs), "%lld", offsLogfile); + eiWriteRec(gf, "END:", 4, offs, len); + close(gf->fd); + DBGPRINTF("encryption info file %s: closed\n", gf->eiName); +} + +static rsRetVal +gcryfileConstruct(gcryctx ctx, gcryfile *pgf, uchar *logfn) +{ + char fn[MAXFNAME+1]; + gcryfile gf; + DEFiRet; + + CHKmalloc(gf = calloc(1, sizeof(struct gcryfile_s))); + gf->ctx = ctx; + snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s%s", logfn, ENCINFO_SUFFIX); + fn[MAXFNAME] = '\0'; /* be on save side */ + gf->eiName = (uchar*) strdup(fn); + *pgf = gf; +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + + +gcryctx +gcryCtxNew(void) +{ + gcryctx ctx; + ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(struct gcryctx_s)); + ctx->algo = GCRY_CIPHER_AES128; + ctx->mode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC; + return ctx; +} + +int +gcryfileDestruct(gcryfile gf, off64_t offsLogfile) +{ + int r = 0; + if(gf == NULL) + goto done; + + eiClose(gf, offsLogfile); + free(gf->eiName); + free(gf); +done: return r; +} +void +rsgcryCtxDel(gcryctx ctx) +{ + if(ctx != NULL) { + free(ctx); + } +} + +static inline void +addPadding(gcryfile pF, uchar *buf, size_t *plen) +{ + unsigned i; + size_t nPad; + nPad = (pF->blkLength - *plen % pF->blkLength) % pF->blkLength; + DBGPRINTF("libgcry: addPadding %d chars, blkLength %d, mod %d, pad %d\n", + *plen, pF->blkLength, *plen % pF->blkLength, nPad); + for(i = 0 ; i < nPad ; ++i) + buf[(*plen)+i] = 0x00; + (*plen)+= nPad; +} + +static inline void +removePadding(char *buf, size_t *plen) +{ + unsigned len = (unsigned) *plen; + unsigned iSrc, iDst; + char *frstNUL; + + frstNUL = strchr(buf, 0x00); + if(frstNUL == NULL) + goto done; + iDst = iSrc = frstNUL - buf; + + while(iSrc < len) { + if(buf[iSrc] != 0x00) + buf[iDst++] = buf[iSrc]; + ++iSrc; + } + + *plen = iDst; +done: return; +} + +/* returns 0 on succes, positive if key length does not match and key + * of return value size is required. + */ +int +rsgcrySetKey(gcryctx ctx, unsigned char *key, uint16_t keyLen) +{ + uint16_t reqKeyLen; + int r; + + reqKeyLen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(ctx->algo); + if(keyLen != reqKeyLen) { + r = reqKeyLen; + goto done; + } + ctx->keyLen = keyLen; + ctx->key = malloc(keyLen); + memcpy(ctx->key, key, keyLen); + r = 0; +done: return r; +} + +rsRetVal +rsgcrySetMode(gcryctx ctx, uchar *modename) +{ + int mode; + DEFiRet; + + mode = rsgcryModename2Mode((char *)modename); + if(mode == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_NONE) { + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_CRY_INVLD_MODE); + } + ctx->mode = mode; +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + +rsRetVal +rsgcrySetAlgo(gcryctx ctx, uchar *algoname) +{ + int algo; + DEFiRet; + + algo = rsgcryAlgoname2Algo((char *)algoname); + if(algo == GCRY_CIPHER_NONE) { + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_CRY_INVLD_ALGO); + } + ctx->algo = algo; +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + +/* As of some Linux and security expert I spoke to, /dev/urandom + * provides very strong random numbers, even if it runs out of + * entropy. As far as he knew, this is save for all applications + * (and he had good proof that I currently am not permitted to + * reproduce). -- rgerhards, 2013-03-04 + */ +void +seedIV(gcryfile gf, uchar **iv) +{ + int fd; + + *iv = malloc(gf->blkLength); /* do NOT zero-out! */ + /* if we cannot obtain data from /dev/urandom, we use whatever + * is present at the current memory location as random data. Of + * course, this is very weak and we should consider a different + * option, especially when not running under Linux (for Linux, + * unavailability of /dev/urandom is just a theoretic thing, it + * will always work...). -- TODO -- rgerhards, 2013-03-06 + */ + if((fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)) > 0) { + if(read(fd, *iv, gf->blkLength)) {}; /* keep compiler happy */ + close(fd); + } +} + +rsRetVal +rsgcryInitCrypt(gcryctx ctx, gcryfile *pgf, uchar *fname) +{ + gcry_error_t gcryError; + gcryfile gf = NULL; + uchar *iv = NULL; + DEFiRet; + + CHKiRet(gcryfileConstruct(ctx, &gf, fname)); + + gf->blkLength = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(ctx->algo); + + gcryError = gcry_cipher_open(&gf->chd, ctx->algo, ctx->mode, 0); + if (gcryError) { + dbgprintf("gcry_cipher_open failed: %s/%s\n", + gcry_strsource(gcryError), + gcry_strerror(gcryError)); + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_ERR); + } + + gcryError = gcry_cipher_setkey(gf->chd, gf->ctx->key, gf->ctx->keyLen); + if (gcryError) { + dbgprintf("gcry_cipher_setkey failed: %s/%s\n", + gcry_strsource(gcryError), + gcry_strerror(gcryError)); + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_ERR); + } + + seedIV(gf, &iv); + gcryError = gcry_cipher_setiv(gf->chd, iv, gf->blkLength); + if (gcryError) { + dbgprintf("gcry_cipher_setiv failed: %s/%s\n", + gcry_strsource(gcryError), + gcry_strerror(gcryError)); + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_ERR); + } + CHKiRet(eiOpenAppend(gf)); + CHKiRet(eiWriteIV(gf, iv)); + *pgf = gf; +finalize_it: + free(iv); + if(iRet != RS_RET_OK && gf != NULL) + gcryfileDestruct(gf, -1); + RETiRet; +} + +int +rsgcryEncrypt(gcryfile pF, uchar *buf, size_t *len) +{ + int gcryError; + DEFiRet; + + if(*len == 0) + FINALIZE; + + addPadding(pF, buf, len); + gcryError = gcry_cipher_encrypt(pF->chd, buf, *len, NULL, 0); + if(gcryError) { + dbgprintf("gcry_cipher_encrypt failed: %s/%s\n", + gcry_strsource(gcryError), + gcry_strerror(gcryError)); + ABORT_FINALIZE(RS_RET_ERR); + } +finalize_it: + RETiRet; +} + + +/* module-init dummy for potential later use */ +int +rsgcryInit(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +/* module-deinit dummy for potential later use */ +void +rsgcryExit(void) +{ + return; +} |