diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | runtime/librsgt.c | 99 |
1 files changed, 97 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/runtime/librsgt.c b/runtime/librsgt.c index 4ad4ec26..89a82f41 100644 --- a/runtime/librsgt.c +++ b/runtime/librsgt.c @@ -96,20 +96,110 @@ rsgtExit(void) } + + +static inline void +tlvbufPhysWrite(gtctx ctx) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "emu: writing TLV file!\n"); + ctx->tlvIdx = 0; +} + +static inline void +tlvbufChkWrite(gtctx ctx) +{ + if(ctx->tlvIdx == sizeof(ctx->tlvBuf)) { + tlvbufPhysWrite(ctx); + } +} + + +/* write to TLV file buffer. If buffer is full, an actual call occurs. Else + * output is written only on flush or close. + */ +static inline void +tlvbufAddOctet(gtctx ctx, int8_t octet) +{ + tlvbufChkWrite(ctx); + ctx->tlvBuf[ctx->tlvIdx++] = octet; +} +static inline void +tlvbufAddOctetString(gtctx ctx, int8_t *octet, int size) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0 ; i < size ; ++i) + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, octet[i]); +} +static inline void +tlvbufAddInteger(gtctx ctx, uint32_t val) +{ + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, (val >> 24) & 0xff); + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, (val >> 16) & 0xff); + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, (val >> 8) & 0xff); + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, val & 0xff); +} + + +void +tlv8Write(gtctx ctx, int flags, int tlvtype, int len) +{ + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, (flags << 5)|tlvtype); + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, len & 0xff); +} + +void +tlv16Write(gtctx ctx, int flags, int tlvtype, uint16_t len) +{ + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, ((flags|1) << 13)|tlvtype); + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, (len >> 8) & 0xff); + tlvbufAddOctet(ctx, len & 0xff); +} + +void +tlvFlush(gtctx ctx) +{ + if(ctx->tlvIdx != 0) + tlvbufPhysWrite(ctx); +} + +void tlvClose(gtctx ctx) +{ + tlvFlush(ctx); + fprintf(stderr, "emu: close tlv file\n"); +} + +/* note: if file exists, the last hash for chaining must + * be read from file. + */ +void tlvOpen(gtctx ctx) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "emu: open tlv file\n"); + ctx->tlvIdx = 0; +} + void seedIV(gtctx ctx) { /* FIXME: this currently is "kindergarten cryptography" - use a * sufficiently strong PRNG instead! Just a PoC so far! Do NOT * use in production!!! + * As of some Linux and security expert I spoke to, /dev/urandom + * provides very strong random numbers, even if it runs out of + * entropy. As far as he knew, this is save for all applications + * (and he had good proof that I currently am not permitted to + * reproduce). -- rgerhards, 2013-03-04 */ ctx->IV = rand() * 1000037; } gtctx -rsgtCtxNew(void) +rsgtCtxNew(void, char *logfilename) { - return calloc(1, sizeof(struct gtctx_s)); + gtctx ctx; + ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(struct gtctx_s)); + ctx->logfilename = strdup(logfilename); + tlvOpen(ctx); + return ctx; } void @@ -117,6 +207,9 @@ rsgtCtxDel(gtctx ctx) { if(ctx == NULL) goto done; + + tlvClose(ctx); + free(ctx->logfilename); free(ctx); /* TODO: persist! */ done: return; @@ -133,6 +226,7 @@ sigblkInit(gtctx ctx) // } memset(ctx->roots_valid, 0, sizeof(ctx->roots_valid)/sizeof(char)); ctx->nRoots = 0; + ctx->nRecords = 0; } @@ -235,6 +329,7 @@ sigblkAddRecord(gtctx ctx, const uchar *rec, const size_t len) t = NULL; } ctx->x_prev = x; /* single var may be sufficient */ + ++ctx->nRecords; /* cleanup */ GTDataHash_free(m); |